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RECENT ABORTION LAW REFORMS (OR MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING)
HARVEY L. ZIFF
The author is a graduate of Northwestern University School of Law's two-year Prosecution-Defense
Graduate Student Program. He received his LL.M. degree in June, 1969, after completing one year in
residence and one year in the field as an Assistant United States Attorney in San Francisco, Califor-
nia. The present article was prepared in satisfaction of the graduate thesis requirement. (It repre-
sents the author's own views and in no way reflects the attitude of the Office of United States Attorney.)
Mr. Ziff received his B.S. degree in Economics from the Wharton School of Finance of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania in 1964. His interest turned to medical-legal problems at Stanford University
Law School, where he received an LL.B. degree in 1967. While at Stanford, he was a member of
the Board of Editors of the Stanford Law Review.
After surveying the statutory and case law governing abortions and considering the relevant social
and medical issues, Mr. Ziff recommends unregulated medical control during the first sixteen weeks of
pregnancy.
The law regulating induced abortion is one of
the most widely discussed medical-legal problems
of the present time. In recent years literature on
the subject has become voluminous, stirring up
intense emotional reaction and violent debate.
Recently, four states have revised their laws,
using the proposal in the Model Penal Code as a
guide. This paper will critically evaluate the
Model Penal Code proposal. Detailed examination
will be made of the social problems which are
responsible for recent legal revisions. This exami-
nation will be followed by (1) a description of the
reasons why the reforms which have been passed
are likely to be ineffective in dealing with the
conditions which impelled their enactment, (2)
an analysis of the legal problems involved in
passing an effective reform, and (3) a proposal
based on the preceding analysis.
The term "abortion" causes confusion because
its meaning varies according to the profession
which employs it. In medical usage, abortion
generally refers to the premature expulsion from
the uterus of the products of conception at a time
before viability, i.e., before the fetus has reached
such a stage of development that it can live out-
side the uterus." The twenty-sixth to the twenty-
eighth week of pregnancy is regarded as the time
of viability.2 After that time, "miscarriage"' or
"premature labor"' are the terms used by medical
authorities for premature expulsion of the fetus.
1 DoRLAwD, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689
(24th ed. 1965).
2 TAussiG, ABORTiON, SPONTANEOUS AN INnucED 21
(1936).
aALOy, MnEDIcA DICTIONARY rOR LAwYERs 380
(1951).
4 DosrLAN, supra note 1, at 789.
The law makes no distinction based on viability.
Criminal abortion generally refers to any untimely
delivery voluntarily procured with intent to
destroy the fetus before natural birth.5 However,
few criminal abortions are performed after the
third month of pregnancy because abdominal
operations are required after that time.6 Conse-
quently, most criminal abortions are categorized
correctly as abortions in medical terminology.
GENEAIL STATE OF THE LAW
Every state in the union has a statute which
makes the termination of pregnancy a crime.
However, all but Louisiana provide exceptions by
statute or case law 7 Most states are restrictive
and limit legal abortion to the narrow grounds of
necessity to "preserve" s or "save" 9 the life of
5Many abortion statutes punish the attempt to
induce an abortion. Thus the crime may be committed
with a woman who is not pregnant. See, e.g., ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, §23-1 (1965).
6 TAussIo, supra note 2, at 327-40.7 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §14.87 (1950). There is an
inconsistency in the Louisiana statutes, however. Per-
formance of an abortion is not a cause for revocation of
a medical license when "done for the relief of a woman
whose life appears in peril.... .. " LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§37:1285.
8 ALAS. STAT. tit 11, §15.060 (1962).
DEL. CODE ANi. tit 11, §301 (1953).
FLA. STAT. AwN. §782.10 (1965).
GA. CODE ANN.. §26-1101 (1953).
HAwAnI REv. LAWS §309-3, 4 (1955).
IDAuO CODE AxN. §18-601 (1948).
IND. AN. STAT. §10-105 (1956).
KAN. GEN. STAT. AwN. §21-437 (1964).
KY. REV. STAT. §436.020 (1962).
ME.'REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, §9 (1954).
MICH. STAT. AN. §28.204 (1962).
Miss. CoDE ANN. §2223 (1956).
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §94-401 (1947).
NEB. REv. STAT. §28-405 (1965).
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the pregnant woman. Some states permit abortions
to "preserve"'" or "save"' 1 the life of either the
pregnant woman or the child.
A few states do provide wider grounds for
justifiably terminating pregnancy. Thus Alabama
and the District of Columbia permit abortions to
preserve the life or health of the mother,12 and
New Mexico legalizes abortions "to preserve the
life of the woman or to prevent serious or perma-
nent bodily injury" to her.13
Although most states carefully regulate the
grounds on which pregnancy may be justifiably
terminated, 14 the majority, apparently, permit
anyone to perform the operation.15 Prior to 1967,
only ten states and the District of Columbia
required that a physician or surgeon perform the
operation.j 6
N.H. PEv. STAT. ANN. §583:13 (1955).
N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW §§125.05; 125.40; 125.45 (1967).
N.D. CENT. CODE §12-25-01 (1939).
Orno REv. CODE ANN. §2901.16 (1964).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §861 (Supp. 1967).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §11-3-1 (1956).
S.D. CODE §13-3101 (1960).
TEN. CODE ANN. §39-301 (1955).
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-1 (1953).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §101 (1958).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §6-77 (1957).
9 Auz. REv. STAT. AoN. §13-211 (1956).
AREo. STAT. ANN. §41-301 (1964).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §23-1 (1965).
IOWA CODE §701.1 (1950).
N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:87-1 (1953), as interpreted in
State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A. 2d 709
(1948).
TEX. PEN. CODE §§1191, 1196 (1961).
Wis. STAT. §940.04 (1961).
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §53-29 (1958).
Mnm. STAT. §617.18 (1963).
Mo. STAT. ANN. §559.100 (1953).
NEv. REv. STAT. §201.120 (1961).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§16-82, 16-83 (1962).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.02.010 (1961).
"VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-62 (1960).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-2-8 (1966).
2 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §9 (1959).
D.C. CODE ANN. §22-201 (1967).
For states which permit abortions when "necessary
to preserve" the life or health of the mother see
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §19 (1956), as inter
preted in Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675,
171 N.E. 2d 850 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §163.060
(1965).
1 N.M. STAT. AmrN. §40-A-5-3 (1953).
14 But see the Pennsylvania statute which prohibits
only "unlawful" abortions, and has not been judicially
interpreted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4719 (1963). On
Pennsylvania law, see Trout, Therapeutic Abortion
Laws Need Therapy, 37 T~mp. L.Q. 172, 184-86 (1964).
15 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii,
Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Mich., Mo., Minn.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N. D., Ohio., Okla., R. I., S: C.,
S. D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va.,
Wyo. These statutes are cited in notes 8-12 supra.
'6 D.C., Ark., Ill., Me., Mass., Miss., Mo., N. M.,
Recent Legislative Revisions
Since 1967, Colorado, North Carolina, California,
and Maryland have revised their criminal laws
related to abortion. Each of these states has gen-
erally followed the reforms drafted by the
American Law Institute.17 The following dis-
cussion will focus predominantly on the Model
Penal Code provisions since it is likely that other
states which are contemplating reforms will also
use the A.L.I. proposal as a guideline.
The Model Penal Code provisions maintain the
general state of the law in that termination of
pregnancy continues to be unlawful, unless justified
by particular circumstances. However, only a
licensed physician may perform an abortion with
justification. His reasons for terminating a preg-
nancy may be based upon any of four grounds-
if he believes that there is a substantial risk that
(1) continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother,
(2) the child would be born with grave physical or
mental dfect, (3) the pregnancy resulted from
rape, or (4) the pregnancy resulted from incest or
other felonious intercourse. In addition, the
written concurrence of two physicians on the
designated grounds must be filed, either in the
hospital where the operation is to be performed
or in any other place designated by law.
The new Colorado law provides for termination
of pregnancy on the grounds recommended by the
Model Penal Code, but requires the unanimous
approval of a "special hospital board of three
physicians" who are staff members of the hospital
where the operation is to take place.U North
Carolina provides for termination on the Model
Penal Code grounds, but limits the operation to
women who have been residents for four months,
and who have approval of three doctors not
engaged in joint private practice 9 California does
not permit potential defectiveness of the child
as an independent basis for termination, but does
allow termination for the other grounds specified
in the Model Penal Code. However, no termina-
tions are permitted after the twentieth week of
pregnancy. Prior to that time, approval of a
hospital board must be obtained in the following
manner. Between the thirteenth and twentieth
N.Y., Ore., Wis. These statutes are cited in notes 8-13
supra.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE §230.3 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
I CoLo. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §2-50 (1967).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-45.1 (1967).
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week, approval of a hospital board of at least three
licensed physicians is required. Prior to the thir-
teenth week of pregnancy, a board of at least two
licensed physicians is required. Where the board
consists of not more than three physicians, unani-
mous approval is required.
20
These revisions have been hailed as momentous
steps in combating the social problems caused by
the typical repressive abortion statute. For ex-
ample, Governor John A. Love, on signing the
Colorado bill into law, declared that their new
law is "designed to do something about areas
of suffering and abuse which have been of concern
to a great many people for a great period of time."
21
The following discussion will demonstrate that
these "reforms" fall far short of solving problems
with which they reasonably should be expected to
deal.
SocrAL PROBLEMS UNDERLYING THE
NEED FOR REFORm
Although the evils resulting from the repressive
abortion laws prevalent throughout the United
States have been asserted since 1936,22 the thorny
political nature of the subject has retarded official
recognition. "Laws regulating sexual behavior
have no peer at stirring up intense emotional
reaction; and when the element of life itself is
involved, the reaction is compounded. Abortion
is perhaps the only problem in which attitudes
toward sexual activity itself and toward life and
being arein seething turmoil." 21
Understandably, no legislator wishes to be
denounced from the pulpit as a "murderer in the
womb." 24 To minimize the adverse reaction to
their proposals, advocates of reform emphasize
the following distressing social conditions which
indicate the need for revision of the law:
Extent of Illegal Abortions
The starting point for a discussion of the abor-
tion problem is the extent to which the present
'a CAL. PEN. CODE §274, amended by, CAL. HEALTH
& SAYxET CODE §25950-54 (1967).2 1 Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 26, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
21 TAussiG, supra note 2.
23 George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and
Movements for Reform, in ABORTION AN LAW 1
(Smith ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABORTION AN
THE LAw].24 Address by Rev. Lester Kinsolving, First Annual
Dinner Meeting of the Illinois Citizens for the Medical
Control of Abortion, Nov. 16, 1967, Chicago, Illinois
[This organization is hereinafter referred to as
I.C.M.C.A.] ABORTION AND T LAW 226.
law is being violated. Generally accepted is the
estimate that one million illegal abortions are
performed in the United States each year.
25
Based on this estimate, approximately one out of
every five pregnancies in the United States ter-
minates in illegal abortion.2 These figures are
discounted by opponents of reform who readily
point out the impossibility of obtaining ac-
curate statistics in this area.N They note that
the same authorities who formulated the one
million figure also stated that a plausible estimate
of the frequency of induced abortion in the United
States could be as low as two hundred thousand,
and that there is no objective basis for the selection
of a particular figure.N
Even if one accepts the lower estimates, the
statistics do establish that a serious problem
exists.21 One author reports that police consider
criminal abortion to be the third largest illegal
endeavor in the country, following only gambling
and narcotics.30 The potent combination of strong
demand and opportunity for exploitation make
for potentially high profits. "The terrific frustra-
tion of a woman who wants a child and cannot
have one... does not compare with the intensity
of emotion and determination of the woman who
does not want a child, is pregnant, and won't have
it." 1 At the same time, a woman who goes to an
abortionist is really an applicant for a favor;
3 2
consequently, she rarely will leave his office with
much more than cab fare.n
The nature of the business requires that it be
well organized, although illicit abortion services
apparently are not controlled by any single orga-
nization. The professional abortionist needs an
office, medical equipment, and some assistants.
Customers must be able to locate him, even though
2
6 BATES & ZAwADsKy, CRnINAL ABORTION 3 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as CRIMIAL ABORTION].
26 Ibid.
27 See Ratner, Abortion: A Public Health Viewpoint,
131 ILL. MED. J. 687 (1967).
28 ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (Calderone
ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as ABORTION IN T=E UNID
STATES].2
9 Kleegman, in ABORTION IN THE UNrrED STATES
104.
30 See ScHU, CERsS WITHOUT VICTMs 25 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CRIEs WITHOUT VICTIMs].
3
1 Kleegman, in ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
113. Extremely desperate women have been known to
shoot themselves in the abdomen in an effort to ter-
minate their pregnancy. Koss, Fatal Gunshot Wound of
Foetus Inflicted by the Mother, 4 AUST.-NEw ZEAL. J.





he must maintain a certain amount of anonymity.
Intervention by the police must be avoided as well.
The court records in New York reveal the
operations of two complex organizations known as
abortion "mills" and "rings." 4 The mill is com-
prised of one or several abortionists working
regularly in a single locale and aborting a dozen
women daily. The less common ring consists of
"interacting abortionists or mills working inter-
mittently at several occasionally changing locations
and aborting an even more considerable number
of women daily." 31 The rings are clandestine and
swiftly-operating organizations. They may give
the woman a code number by telephone and
order her to meet the abortion contact in a parking
lot. There, the contact may blindfold her and give
her sleep-inducing drugs. After the operation he
will return her to the parking lot in less than an
hour'
A sizeable portion of the price charged goes to
intermediaries because the successful abortionist
requires both business and medical assistants.
He needs a shrewd secretary who can gauge the
financial status of an applicant in order to charge
the highest possible fee.3 He requires channels to
direct patients to him. Physicians and druggists
are the primary source of referral;" others include
women formerly aborted and satisfied with the
results, taxi-drivers, and bell-boys. 9 Fees are
split with all of these "feeders" except the former
patients. The abortionist also has a business agent
to handle contacts with the landlord, payment of
salaries, bills, bribe money and split fees. The
agent is usually a relative or a close friend who
can be trusted with this confidential position. 4°
Few police officers have any illicit connection
with abortionists; however, some do take advan-
tage of the opportunities for extorting a known
abortionist who is working in a fixed location. A
common practice is to send a decoy, willing to
submit to the operation, to the abortionist. The
officers stop her as she attempts to leave the
office. After "protesting" the legitimate nature of
her visit, she "breaks down" and "confesses."
The abortionist, who cannot know whether the
" Id. at 51.
5 Ibid.
ss Lader, The Scandal of Abortion Laws, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 1965, §6 (Magazine), at 32, 59-60.
7 CmnmAL ABORTION 52. Even if the price had been
agreed upon previously, the abortionist's secretary will
make every effort to raise the price. Id. at 56.
"Id. at 53.
39 Id. at 55.
40 Id. at 52.
raid is 'legitimate," has no choice but to agree
to bribe the officers!'
The activities just described should not be
tolerated even if one were to assume that illegal
abortions are performed in a hygienic manner.
The glaring need for adequate revision of the law
thus becomes obvious when the suffering inflicted
on women as a result of these activities is revealed.
Illegal abortions are a significant contributor
to injuries suffered by women. Early commentators
estimated five to ten thousand deaths per year
are caused by abortions.4 2 As the use of antibiotics
and increased care has become more common,
4
1
a lower figure of one thousand deaths per year
may now be more accurate." Nevertheless, recent
studies in California46 and New York" indicate
that criminal abortion remains responsible for
more maternal deaths than any other cause.
The most common victims are married housewives,
with several children, who attempted to abort
themselves.0
The techniques which cause death are numerous
and variable. Several of these are often combined,
each contributing to the fatality. Oral medications
are commonly followed by direct assaults upon
the uterus, apparently after the drugs seemed
ineffective.8 These medications range from Castor
oil to turpentine.49 Fluids injected into the uterine
canal include pine oil, lysol, soap, and alcohol.5"
Among the rigid objects forced into the uterus
are chopsticks, copper wire, curtain rods, knitting
needles, and coat hangers." Air is sometimes
forced into the uterus by using a catheter, plastic
straw, or football pump.52 Sepsis, i.e., infection,
is the basic medical cause of death." Other medical
causes of death, which may be found in combina-
tion with each other or with sepsis, include shock,
hemorrhage, air or fat embolism, and poisoning.5
41Id. at 69.
42 CRUM WITHouT Vicrmis 28.
U Ibid.
"Barno, Criminal Abortion Deaths, 98 Am J. OBSTET-
ics & Gvxco.oox 357 (1967). But see id. at 364.
45 Montgomery & Hammersly, Maternal Deaths in
California, 1957-62, 100 CAL. Mxn. 412, 415 (1964);
Fox, Abortion Deaths in California, 98 Am. J. OBSTET-
Ries & G'NEcoLoGy 645 (1967).
4" Gold, Erhardt, Jacobnizer & Nelson, Therapeutic
Abortions in New York City: A 20-Year Review, 55 Am.
J. PUB. HBALTr 964, 965 (1965).
4 Fox, supra note 45, at 649-51.
8Id. at 649.




" Id. at 650.
"GRADwOHL, LEGAL Mv1EDICINE 814 (1954).
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Even though the aborted woman usually sur-
vives, almost all abortions performed by persons
other than qualified physicians cause medical
complications which require treatment."5 As in
fatal cases, the most common after-effect is sepsis
because the uterus is a delicate organ which is
highly susceptible to infection." Most women
who induce their own abortions fail to take proper
hygienic precautions. Mill abortionists, also,
often omit elementary aseptic techniques in order
to save time in performing operations and increase
profits1 To treat the infections which result,
forty per cent of women admitted to hospitals
after improper abortions require blood trans-
fusions; the average hospital stay is seven days.P
In some cases good medical procedure dictates an
immediate and total hysterectomy without a
delay to assess the effectiveness of antibiotic
therapy. 9 All cases of septic abortion call for
early diagnosis, treatment, and meticulous sup-
portive care. 0
The amount of pain and humiliation inflicted by
abortionists is staggering. Although physician-
abortionists should be capable of operating in a
professional manner without causing serious
complications, the physician who has become a
professional abortionist is almost invariably a
deviate. Some are alcoholics who operate with
disasterous results while they are intoxicated,
61
and others are sexual perverts, 2 as are many
non-physician abortionists. 3 Many criminal abor-
tionists have little or no medical training, and
55 Cases involving criminal intervention "must be
presumed infected." Moritz & Thompson, Septic
Abortion 95 Am. J. OBsTETICs & G-mEco oGY 46, 47
(1966).
Is The risk of infection is ten times greater in abortion
cases than in natural childbirth, since in every case the
uterine cavity must be invaded, whereas at childbirth
this is rarely the case. TAussIG, supra note 2, at 186.
57 CannmAL ABORTION 58.
"Goodno, Cushner, & Molumphy, Management of
Infected Abortion, 85 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNEcOLoGY
16, 17-18 (1963).
59 Decker & Hall, Treatment of Abortion Infected with
Clostridium Welchii, 95 AM. J. OsTEmmIcs & GYNE-
coLoGY 394, 398 (1966).
£0 Moritz &Thompson, supra note 55, at 53.61 C nNA ABORTION 95. Occasionally a physician
will become a professional abortionist out of a sincere
concern for the well-being of women who adamantly
wish to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. One such
man is Dr. G. Lotrell Timanus, now retired, who per-
formed over 5000 abortions with only two deaths. He
had referrals from 353 physicians. Star, The Growing
Tragedy of Illegal Abortion, LooK MAGAZINE 149, 153
(Oct. 19, 1965).
aCRMuNAL ABORTION 95, 177.
"See Duprp & HimsRBERG, SEX AND CanRt 136-44
(1965).
come from the ranks of elevator operators, barbers,
and unskilled laborers 4 Posing as physicians,
they may attempt to perform a standard hospital
operation known as a dilatation and curettage,
or 'TD & C." The surgeon dilates the cervix,
introduces a long, semi-sharp, spoon-shaped
instrument called a curette, and scrapes the
uterine cavity. Gentleness is the key to a proper
operation;6 only a physician with obstetrical
training is qualified to evacuate the uterus.0
Unskilled hands can easily damage the uterus
and other nearby organs when they attempt this
delicate procedure.6
The lack of medical training is compounded
because anesthetics are seldom used, another
attempt to complete operations quickly, and also
a precaution against a medical accident resulting
in complications or homicide." Accordingly, the
following account of an abortion is understandable:
Q. What did you feel at that time?
A. Well, there was so much pain-and I just
don't-I can't explain it really. I just know it
was like my whole stomach was coming out.0
When the current laws were originally enacted,
all abortions were dangerous procedures.70 Im-
provements have taken place in medical practice
since that time. The D & C operation will be
quite harmless when performed in a hospital
under sanitary conditions today. The renowned
physician Alan F. Guttmacher stated:
There is little scientific evidence that in the
United States today... any marked deterioration
in the physical condition of women, aborted for
therapeutic reasons in a hospital setting, will take
place.... If the operation is properly performed
so that no infection or laceration of the cervix
results, it will have no effect on either the health
of the woman or her reproductive future.'
In addition to the D & C, an even safer, and
almost painless, method of performing abortions
in the early stages of pregnancy recently has been
developed. In this procedure, the vacuum aspi-
'A C _unN ABORTION 35.
01 TAUssIG, supra note 2, at 193.6 Id. at 238.
67 Shenoi, Massive Removal of Small Bowel During
Criminal Abortion, 2 BRir. MED. J. 929 (1966).
"CRnmNNA ABORTION 58.60 Id. at 4.
70 Editorial, 199 J.A.M.A. 211 (1967). See STORER,
WHY NOT? A BooK: o R EvERY Womm 36 (1866).71 Guttmacher, The Shrinking Nonpsychiatric Indi-
cations for Therapeutic Abortion, in THERAEuTic
ABORTION 12 (Rosen ed. 1954).
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ration method, a tube connected to a suction
pump is inserted into the uterus. The uteral
contents are then evacuated by negative pressure
from the pump 7 2 Dilatation is often unnecessary,
thereby eliminating the need for an anesthetic in
many cases. In contrast to the incidence of
perforation of the uterus in normal curettage
which ranges from 0.09 per cent to 6 per cent,74
the chance of perforation with vacuum aspiration
is virtually 0 per cent; one study reported no
cases of perforation in 4,000 pregnancy termina-
tions.7 Furthermore, the entire procedure requires
only one to three minutes.76
Obviously, all the suffering women endure
because of the restrictive laws which compel them
to perform crude and lethal operations on them-
selves, or submit to the butchery and lechery of
criminal abortionists, is unnecessary. If sanitary
facilities were made available to these women,
this misery would be eliminated.
Lack of Enforcement of Present Laws-the
Problem of Crime Without Victims
The abortion statutes have been as unsuccessful
in prohibiting abortions as the eighteenth amend-
ment was in eradicating drinking." Contributing
to this situation is the historical lack of vigorous
enforcement of these laws. Alabama had 40 pros-
ecutions and 5 convictions in the period between
1892 and 1935. 8 In a similar period Michigan
recorded 40 convictionsY9 Commenting on the
California law, which at that time restricted
abortions to those necessary to save the life of
the pregnant woman, Alfred Kinsey stated:
The chief thing that the abortion laws do is to
provide a basis for yellow journals to put on a
campaign once in a while. Then you may see
twenty abortionists convicted in a single week,
and there may be at a given time thirty or forty
abortionists in prison in the state, as a result of
2 Peretz, Grunstein, Brandes, & Paldi, Evacuation of
the Gravid Uterus by Negative Pressure, 98 Am. J. OB-
sTETRUcs & GYNEcoooY 18 (1967); Vladow, The
Vacuum Aspiration Method for Interruption of Early
Pregnancy, 99 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 202
(1967).
73 Kerslake & Casey, Abortion Induced by Means of
the Uterine Aspirator, 30 OBSTETRICs & GYNECOLOGY
35, 36 (1967).
71 Id. at 38.
75 Vojta, A Critical View of Vacuum Aspiration, 30
OBSTETICS & GYNECOLOGY 28, 31 (1967).76 Peretz, et al., supra note 72, at 21.
77 Moore, Antiquated Abortion Laws, 20 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 250, 251 (1963).
78 29 J. Cns. L. & C. 595, 596 (1937).
79 Note, 35 COLVm. L. REv. 87,91 (1935).
the sudden application of a law that is ordinarily
a dead letter 8
The most crucial problem involved in enforcing
laws prohibiting abortion, assuming officials are
interested in enforcing these laws, is the lack of a
complainant. Even after an extremely frightening
or distasteful experience, a woman is unlikely to
file a complaint which would surely require her
testimony in open court, exposing her willing
participation in an illicit activity.8 ' Therefore,
methods other than direct reporting by the aborted
woman must be utilized to develop a case. The
most effective device for obtaining the necessary
evidence against a professional abortionist is the
well-timed, well-organized raid.82 Prior to the
raid, lengthy surveillance must be undertaken
in order to apprehend the abortionist in the course
of the operation. Often, medical advisors and
female assistants accompany the police to direct
the collection of evidence and to calm the woman.
Even these expensive and time consuming efforts
may be thwarted. An elaborate organization may
equip its office with an alarm which, in combination
with a secret escape door, permits the aborted
woman and soiled instruments to be removed from
the scene, even as the police enter all known en-
trances to the building."
Furthermore, the collection of convincing
evidence does not assure convictions. The courts
distinguish between lay abortionists and phy-
sicians. Sympathetic juries are reluctant to convict
doctors, 84 and judges often impose suspended
sentences rather than prison terms86 Also, suc-
cessful prosecutions are commonly reversed on
8 ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 39.
81 CRIMINAL ABORTION 92.
' CRnHs WIrouT VicTIss 37.
83 CRIMINAL ABORTION 65.
8 Leavy, Criminal Abortion: Facing the Facts, 34 L.A.
BAR BuLL. 355 (1959). The experience in Chicago
between 1950 and 1965 does not support this contention
very strongly. Although the conviction rate for non-
physicians was 54% while the conviction rate for.
physicians was 29%, the difference was in large part due
to the much greater proportion of guilty pleas entered
by nonphysicians. For those who went to trial, the con-
viction rate for nonphysicians was 39% while the rate
for physicians was 31%. Nevertheless, convictions are
difficult to obtain even when guilty pleas are included.
Only 49% of all defendants arrested for abortion
offenses were found guilty. (Information obtained from
the files of the Chicago Crime Commission.)
81 ABORTON as THE UNITED STATES 37. The experi-
ence in Chicago does not support this assertion at all.
Of 8 physicians who were found guilty after trial, 5, or
62%, were sentenced to prison. Of 19 nonphysicians
who were found guilty after trial, 11, or 57%, were
given prison terms. However, for all defendants, in-
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appeal. One scandal ridden Illinois case involved a
"million dollar ring" which operated in downtown
Chicago around 1940. For some time prior to
their arrest, the abortionists had been bribing
several members of the State Attorney's office.
The Illinois Supreme Court was forced to reverse
the convictions obtained against the illegal abor-
tionists because a search and seizure of records had
been made without a warrant. According to the
Court, the violation appeared to be deliberate
because there had been enough evidence to secure
a warrant at least a week before the raid., Un-
derstandably, critics feel the effort involved in
developing a successful case against an abortionist
is "out of proportion to the results achieved." 7
Disregard of Legal Restrictions by Reputable
Physicians
Possibly the most significant impetus to legal
reform has been the classic study, conducted by
Stanford Professors Packer and Gampell, which
demonstrated that reputable hospitals and phy-
sicians knowingly perform illegal abortions."
Packer and Gampell asked twenty-nine represen-
tative California hospitals to indicate whether
they would perform abortions in eleven hypo-
thetical situations. These situations included
cases clearly illegal and cases of dubious legality
under the California law which, at that time,
allowed abortions only if necessary to save the
life of the pregnant woman. No case, not even the
one based upon purely socio-economic reasons,
was uniformly rejected. There was a significant
diversity of opinion among the hospitals as to
the appropriate medical standard for the per-
formance of therapeutic abortions.P The most
commonly approved justifications are embodied
in the Model Penal Code proposal.
Physicians have also indicated their desire for
relaxation of the law in surveys conducted among
members of the profession. In a survey of New
York obstetricians, an overwhelming majority
favored legalization of abortions when performed
for the reasons set out in the Model Penal Code."
cluding those who plead guilty and those whose cases
were dismissed, only 14% were sentenced to prison
terms.
(8 People v. Martin, 382 ll. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997
(1942).
8C naNAL ABORTION 6.
"Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Prob-
lem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. Rzv. 417 (1959).
81 Id. at 447.
0 Hall, New York Abortion Law Survey, 93 Am. J.
OBsTETRIcs & GYNEcoLoGY 1182 (1965).
A poll of California obstetricians and gynecologists
revealed similar sentiments. Additionally, thirty-
four per cent of the California physicians replied
that the question of abortion is a purely personal
matter which should be totally outside the scope
of the law." Moreover, half admitted having
performed abortions which violated the criminal
code which, at that time, limited abortions to
those necessary to save the life of the mother.
2
A nationwide poll recently revealed that 86.9 per
cent of physicians throughout the United States
favor some liberalization of the law, 26.6 per cent
approving of abortion for socio-economic reasons,
and 14.3 per cent approving of abortion at the
request of the woman, for any reason.' 3
Physicians, feeling strongly that the law is
unfair, and knowing that it is rarely enforced,
oftdn disregard the law on the assumption that
they are best qualified to make decisions in this
area. For using their best medical judgment,
many physicians may lose their license to practice
medicine. This could occur because the vast
majority of states authorize revocation of a phy-
sician's license when he has committed, or par-
ticipated in, a criminal abortion.4 The astounding
magnitude of the problem is clear when one con-
siders that physicians perform between fifty"
and eighty per cent" of all abortions.
Threats of license revocation are real.7 Recently,
proceedings were instituted against several prom-
inent San Francisco physicians for performing
abortions on women who had contracted German
measles during the early stages of their preg-
nancy. s The physicians had assumed that the
law was a "dead letter," but they were wrong.9
91Obstetricians Back Liberalized Abortion Law in
California, 34 MOD. MED. 24 (Dec. 1966).
2Ibid.3 Abortion: The Doctor's Dilemma, 35 MoD. MED.
No. 9, at 12 (1967).
4See statutes compiled in George, Current Abortion
Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, in ABoR-
TION AND THE LAW 1, 17.
95 TAUSSIG, supra note 2, at 388.
"8 GEBHARD, POIEROY, MARTIN & CHRISTENSON,
PREGNANCY, BRTH & ABORTION 198 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as PREGNANCY, BmmT3 & ABORTION]. But see
ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 65, where it is claimed
that the majority are self-induced.
9Russell & Chayet, Abortion Laws and the Physician
276 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1027, 1028 (1967). Medical
journals often advise physicians to be careful in obeying
the law. E.g., Abortion, Protect Yourself, 65 Wis. MED.
J. 28 (Jan. 1966).
"s When German measles is contracted before the
twelfth week of pregnancy, there is a 30% to 50%
chance that the offspring will suffer from severe con-
genital abnormalities if the pregnancy is carried to
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Singling out a few physicians for violating a
widely disregarded, rarely enforced, and un-
popular law seems inherently unfair. The lack of
notice may raise due process questions of con-
stitutional dimension. Even when local authorities
do not intend to enforce restrictive statutes,
"physicians may well find it galling that their
freedom from criminal and civil liability turns
merely on the nonenforcement of law." 100 Un-
doubtedly, these unenforced laws inhibit phy-
sicians from using their best medical judgment.
Such statutes provide inadequate criteria by
which physicians can govern their actions.
"'Dead letter' laws, far from promoting a sense
of security in the community, which is the main
function of penal law, actually impair that
security by holding the threat of prosecution over
the heads of people whom we have no intention
to punish." 101 From this perspective, a revision of
the law which would bring it into conformity
with accepted medical judgment and practice is
both desirable and necessary.
Other Considerations Indicating Need
for Revision
Those who seek to relax restrictions on the
performance of abortions by physicians often
emphasize the problems just described. However,
other consequences of the present laws quite
possibly constitute more compelling justifications
for revising the abortion statutes.
1. Inhibition of Vital Medical Research. An
extremely important problem facing this nation
and the world is the population explosion. Two-
thirds of the world's people are underfed or under-
nourished. Among low-income, poorly educated
parents, 54 per cent of their children were un-
planned and unwanted. Usually they wanted two
or three children, and had four to six. Even in the
United States approximately 50 million people
are living at the poverty or near poverty level.
Of these, 22 million are children, nearly one-third
of the nation's youth. °2 Unless inexpensive and
effective methods of birth control are developed
term. Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion, A
Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, in ABORTION AND THE
LAW 72, 81.
92 The National Observer, May 30, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
100 Gampell, Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion and
Sterilization in the United States, 7 CLrx. OBSTERCS
& GYNEco.oGY 22, 27 (1964).
01 MODEL PENAL CODE §207.11, Comment at 151
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
1 NATIONAL HEALTH EDUCATION COMMrTTEE, WHAT
ARE THE FACTS ABOUT THE POPULATION CRISIS? (1966).
and made available, millions of people will be
forced into a low standard of living and, perhaps,
starvation.
One of the more promising areas of birth control
research has been in the development of the
intrauterine contraceptive device, or IUD. These
devices include a ring made of stainless steel
spring, a polyethylene spiral, a double-S loop of
plastic, and a double triangle of plastic." 3 Insertion
by a physician takes only a minute, and it will
remain effective until removed. In Japan, women
have been known to have them in place for twenty
years or more. They have never been known to
cause a malignant cervical disease, and fertility is
unimpaired after the device is removed. The
IUD's fulfill the requirements for widespread use
among the groups who need them most because
they are inexpensive and require no daily at-
tention."4
There is good reason to believe that the IUD
does not actually prevent pregnancy, but causes
an early termination after conception by pre-
venting,"°5 or disrupting,"' implantation. After
conception, the fertilized ovum travels down the
fallopian tubes, enters the uterus and nidates, or
affixes, itself in the uterine tissue. The time between
fertilization and implantation is estimated to be
seven or eight days. 1" When implantation is
prevented or disrupted, the fertilized ovum will
be discharged, and the pregnancy terminated.
Assuming these devices work as theorized,
insertion alone would clearly violate abortion laws
of the many states which define the crime in
terms of attempt because such statutes do not
require a showing that the woman is pregnant.
Proof problems are probably insurmountable
when the statute requires a showing that the
woman is pregnant; all practical methods used to
0 Meloy, Pre-Implantation Fertility Control and The
Abortion Laws, 41 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 183, 185 (1964).
See generally SEGAL, SOUTHAM & SHFER (eds.),
INTRAUTERINE CONTRACEPTION, PROCEEDINGS OF =x
SECOND INTERNATIONAL CON ERENCE (Exerpta
Medica, International Congress Series No. 86, 1965).
I Clinical Research Calms Fears, Raises Hopes About
Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices, 188 J.A.M.A. MED.
NEws No. 10, at 40 (1964).
105 Bengstson & Mouvad, The Effect of the Lippes
Loop on Human Myometrial Activity, 98 AMx. J OBSTET-
xzcs & GYNECOLOGY 957, 964 (1967).
106 Panchalingham, Is the Contraceptive Intrauterine
Device an Abortifacient?, 1 LANCET 1391 (June 1965).
But see Sammour, Combined Histolic and Cytologic
Study of Intrauterine Contraception, 98 Ar. J. OBsTET-
xxcs & GYNECOLoGY 946 (1967).




determine early pregnancy require the physio-
logical state present after implantation.'1 ' How-
ever, prosecution is still possible under abortion-
related statutes which prohibit the advertisement,
manufacture, transportation, distribution, and
sale of abortifacients. 1 '9
Swedish scientists have recently developed a
"morning after" pill which would cause a woman
to menstruate even if conception had taken placeY0
Use of this pill also would be illegal. One should
seriously question the wisdom of laws which
permit the manufacture and use of a pink con-
traceptive pill, but penalize the manufacture and
use of a green contranidation pill, when both are
Ingested by women in identical fashion. A simple
distinction between abortion during early preg-
nancy and contraception is no longer possible,
but present laws fail to recognize this."'
2. Economic Discrimination. The difference
between an illegal and a therapeutic abortion is
$300 and knowing the right person." 2 Any woman
with sufficient funds can have her pregnancy safely
terminated. A round trip flight from Chicago to
Japan, where abortions have been legal since
1948, costs $953.00. In Japan, more than eight
thousand physicians are licensed to perform the
operation, which costs between $3 and $10. The
woman can have the operation performed by a
recognized gynecologist, and stay in the hospital
for one to three days for $100 to $150."' An esti-
mated ten thousand women also fly to San Juan,
Puerto Rico, where abortions are illegal, but
readily available."4 American abortion applicants
in Sweden uniformly come from upper economic
and educated classes."' In the United States, the
private, rather than the ward, patient is far more
likely to obtain a hospital-approved abortion.
10s The commonly used Ascheim-Zondeck, Friedman,
American male frog and other endocrine pregnancy
tests are ineffective until development of chorionic
tissue. The chorionic tissue is not developed until im-
plantation, and the tests often are not positive until
about three weeks after implantation. WnLrrms,
OBSTzmzcs 273 (12th ed. 1961).
102 Meloy, supra note 103, at 187-92. Note, 46 ORE.
L. REv. 211 (1967).
110 San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 20, 1967, at 21,
ol. 1.
m Illinois Abortion Law Should Be Repealed, pam-
phlet distributed by the I.C.M.C.A., 5638 S. Woodlawn
Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637.
m ABORTION IN TE UNITED SrATEs 121.
"'Star, The Growing Tragedy of Illegal Abortion,
Loox MAGAzIm 149,153 (Oct. 19,1965).
"' Id. at 154.
usRapoport, American Abortion Applicants in
Sweden, 13 AcEmvEs oF GEN. PsYcHIATRY 24 (1965).
Ninety-three per cent of all New York City [ther-
apeutic abortions] .. in the last few years were
performed on white patients, almost all in private
rooms at voluntary hospitals, who could enlist
the aid of prominent doctors to support their
applications. Only 7 per cent went to Negroes,
Puerto Ricans, and others116
Most legal abortions are justified on psychiatric
grounds.' 7 While wealthier women can afford the
services of a psychiatrist who will report that the
pregnancy poses a serious threat to the woman's
life, the cost of such opinions are beyond the
means of most women.' Surely, however, the
wealthy do not need abortions more than the poor.
The results of this economic discrimination are
reflected in the grim statistics on abortion mor-
tality. In New York, twice as many deaths caused
by abortion occur among nonwhites as among
whites.1 9 In California, women from low income
backgrounds are the most frequent fatalities
from improper abortions.12 0 This double standard,
nurtured by present statutes, is incompatible
with any notion of justice.'1 ' It reflects poorly
on the law's concern with the welfare of disad-
vantaged citizens at a time when millions of
dollars are being spent to equalize the medical
care available to all people in this country.
3. Miscellaneous Problems. Unwanted preg-
nancies cause certain problems which are difficult
to categorize. Almost 300,000 illegitimate births
occur in the United States each year, and the
number continues to increase. Undoubtedly,
many of the women did not want their preg-
nancies. The babies frequently become partial
wards of the state, supported by welfare.' 22 Adop-
tion is no solution. The majority of these infants
are nonwhite, and prospects for adoption of
Negro children are dim.' Also, many women,
M Lader, supra note 36, at 59.
W See Guttmacher, supra note 71.
n
8
BoRTioN IN Tim UNITED STATEs 101; Williams,
Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178,
187 (1966).
11- Gold, et al., supra note 46, at 965.
220 Fox, supra note 45, at 645.
"'To argue that the "illegality" of abortions ac-
quired by rich people renders the statement inappro-
priate ignores the facts. Each year, thousands of
abortions which are performed because the pregnant
woman had contracted German measles are, openly
recorded in hospital records throughout the United
States. (Personal communication from Christopher
Tietze). Although these operations may be technically
illegal, there is no threat of prosecution.
" Illegitimacy in the U.S.-It's on the Rise, U.S.
News & World Report 87 (July 18, 1966).
n'See Grove, Children Without Homes: the Adoption
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even though they may be willing to procure an
abortion at an early stage of pregnancy, find
parting with the child too painful after it is born.1
24
When the girl is more than seventeen or eighteen,
adoption of her child will be psychologically
traumatizing in most cases.125 In contrast, few
ill psychological effects result from abortions,
and few patients show regret.126
Marriages entered under duress of pregnancy
often prove unsatisfactory. One-third to one-half
of all high-school or teenage marriages in the
United States are implicated by, or accompanied
by, premarital pregnancy.1" More than half of
these marriages end in divorce within eighteen
months.2 While it would be speculative to esti-
mate exactly how many of the girls who entered
ill-fated marriages would have sought an abortion,
if one had been legally available, one may fairly
presume that the number is significant.
Unwanted children invariably bear the brunt
of much intentional cruelty."9 Lack of affection
in child rearing often leads to delinquency in
boys and prostitution in girls.' While one hundred
per cent effective contraception is the most de-
sirable solution for preventing the birth of un-
wanted babies, it is inevitable that this goal
can never be completely achieved. Many physi-
cians are hesitant to provide contraceptives to
unwed teenage girls, 90 thousand of whom bear
children out of wedlock each year.'' And, even
assuming that all married women of child-bearing
age who do not want to become pregnant use
Problem, Chicago Sun-Times, Tuesday Magazine 4
(Dec. 1967).
1
4 Williams, Legal & Illegal Abortion, 4 BRIT. J.
CGrr. 557, 564 (1964).
12 Hoffmeyer, The Mother and the Family, 28 W.H.O.
PUB. HEALTH PAER 9, 32 (1965).
26 Niswander & Patterson, Psychologic Reaction to
Therapeutic Abortion, 29 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
702 (1967); Kummer, Post-Abortion Psychiatric Illness
-a Myth?, 119 Am. J. Psycir. 980 (1963); but see
Bolter, The Psychiatric Role in Therapeutic Abortion:
The Unwitting Accomplice, 119 Am. J. Psyca. 312
(1962). See generally White, Induced Abortions, A Sur-
vey of their Psychiatric Implications, Complications, and
Indications, 24 TEx. REP. ON BIOLOGY & MED. 529
(1966). In any case, possible trauma from abortion
must be weighed against the likely ill effects to result
from giving birth to, and raising, an unwanted child.
I" Semmens, Implications of Teenage Pregnancy, 26
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 77 (1965).
m Williams, supra note 118, at 188.
"R9 Id. at 194.
10 See 2 LANCET 398 (1964). Cf. Hoffmeyer, Medical
Aspects of the Danish Legislation on Abortion, in ABoR-
ToN AND THE LAw 179, 200.
131 Ayd, Contraceptives for Teenagers?, 18 MED. Scr.
20 (Sept. 1967).
"the pill," the most effective contraceptive availa-
ble, one biologist estimates that this group would
still have 220,000 unwanted pregnancies each
year. 3' A responsible society must face these
facts and attempt to deal effectively with the
problem of unwanted pregnancies.
THE FAILURE Or RECENT LEGISLATION
The proposals recommended by the Model
Penal Code, and recently enacted legislation in
Colorado, North Carolina, California, and Mary-
land, seem plausible and reasonable on their
face. Women no longer will be forced to bear
children conceived by rapists or incestuous rela-
tives. They can avoid the heartbreak of giving
birth to a deformed child (California excepted).
They can terminate pregnancies which involve a
substantial risk of impairing their life or their
health."' However, this legislation is only super-
ficially meritorious and, in fact, is wholly inde-
fensible from the standpoint of combating recog-
nized problems inherent under present law.
Increase in Abortions
Two factors will combine to cause an increase
in the number of illegal abortions wherever a
version of the Model Penal Code proposal is
enacted. First, such legislation will legalize only
between two"4 and four"' per cent of the total
abortions now being performed. Pregnancies
involving rape, incest, or a defective fetus are
exceptional. Advances in medical science are
rapidly eliminating "purely medical" justifications
for terminating pregnancies." 6 Intensive care
prevents threats to the pregnant woman's life,
and, unless "health" is given so broad a definition
as to emasculate the statute entirely, cases involv-
ing serious impairment to health are similarly
nfrequent.:"
13' Hardin, Blueprints, DNA, and Abortion: A Scien-
tific and Ethical Analysis, 3 MED. OPInioN & REv. 74
(Feb. 1967).13
3 See text accompanying notes 17-20, supra.
334 I.C.M.C.A. estimate, Chicago's American, Oct.
22, 1967, See. 4, at 2, col. 3. See Overstreet, Comment,
98 Am. J. OBSTERICS & GYNECOLOGY 652 (1967).
1'5 Based on reports of figures on the increase in
legal abortions performed in Colorado and California
since liberalization, measured against estimated illegal
abortions. A. Guttmacher, Current Data on Facts Con-
cerning Abortion, paper presented at the University of
Chicago Conference on Abortion, April 28, 1968.
1"6 See Guttmacher, supra note 71; Tietze, Some
Facts About Legal Abortion, in HumAN FERTILITY AND
POPULATION PROBLaxs 222, 223 (Greep ed. 1963).
13 Some physicians have advocated adoption of the
World Health Organization's definition of health, "a
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The Model Penal Code proposal refuses to
recognize that most women seek abortions as a
method of birth control. This phenomenon is
universal.1n In the United States, more than
eighty per cent of all abortions are performed
on married women.13' Most of these women
have several children, are pregnant by their own
husbands, and simply do not want another child. 4°
Death and substantial injury from improperly
performed abortions usually strike women in
this category, leaving large families without
mothers. 1
Another major category of illegal abortions,
ignored by the Model Penal Code proposal, occur
among unmarried girls. Ninety-five per cent of
all premarital pregnancies are terminated by
abortion.' 42 If illegal abortions are to be elimi-
nated, reforms must deal with this great discrep-
ancy between law and practice.
The second factor which will cause an increase
in illegal abortions is demonstrated by the ex-
perience of Scandinavian countries. In these
countries, liberalization of the law created an
increased demand for abortions. Denmark en-
acted abortion legislation in 1936 and 1956, so
that the operations would be performed in a
hospital, under safe conditions, and with the aid
of expert medical advice and supervision 4 The
Danish Pregnancy Act provides for legal termina-
tion in four situations. Three are similar to the
justifications found in the Model Penal Code-(l)
where necessary to avert serious danger to life
or health of the woman; (2) where the woman
has become impregnated as a result of specified
criminal acts (rape, incest, or intercourse when
under the age of fifteen); (3) where the child is
likely to be born with any serious physical ab-
normality or disease. The fourth justification
has no counterpart in current United States
state of complete physical, mental, and social well
being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity." Rovinsky & Gusberg, Current Trends in
Termination of Pregnancy, 98 Am. J. OBsTETRICs &
GYNECOLOGY 11, 16 (1967).
" See Darby, Legal Abortion?, 34 MIEDICO-LEGAL J-
96 (1966) (England); Rice-Wray, The Provoked Abortion
-A Major Health Problem, 54 Av. J. PUB. HEALTH
313 (1964) (South America); Hoffmeyer, supra note
130, at 186-87.
"' TAussIG, supra note 2, at 387.
140 Ibid.; Rosen, supra note 98, at 73.
141 The typical abortion fatality in California has had
five previous pregnancies, none of which had been
aborted. Fox, supra note 45, at 651.42 KXinsey, in ABORION IN TE UNITED STATES 54.
143 Skalts & Norgaard, Abortion Legislation in Den-
mark, in ABORTION Aim TBE LAw 144, 146.
proposals-where, because of serious physical
or psychic defects, or other medical reasons, the
woman is deemed unfit to take proper care of
her child.'" In spite of this liberal legislation,
there has probably been an increase in the inci-
dence of illegal abortions. There has been only a
slight decline of illegal abortions in Denmark,14 5
and many Danish women travel to Poland where
abortion is available "on request." 4 6 Presumably,
the abortions in Poland fail to meet legal require-
ments in Denmark, and, therefore, these abor-
tions must be considered to be illegal. Moreover,
the incidence of legal abortion, which also in-
creased, 47 has been based primarily on the fourth
justification. The usual cause for legal abortion
in Denmark has been the "stress syndrome,"
found predominantly among housewives who are
exhausted from maternal duties, or who do not
wish to lower their standard of living. 43 Where
the fourth justification is absent from legislation
as in the Model Penal Code proposal, one may
expect a significant increase, rather than a de-
crease, of illegal abortions. 4
Some experts express the belief that partial
liberalization makes abortion more culturally
acceptable. 150 A greater demand is created be-
cause many women who would not seek an abor-
tion when almost all were illegal, will do so now,
if they feel that their reasons are as compelling
as those provided for by the new reform. The
Model Penal Code reform legalizes less than five
per cent of abortions now performed. Undoubtedly,
it will increase the demand for illegal abortions
by more than that. Consequently, legislation
based on the Model Penal Code proposal can be
expected to increase, rather than reduce, unneces-
sary deaths, serious injuries, and humiliation in-
flicted upon women as a result of illegal abortions.
Continued Disregard by Physicians
The prospect that physicians will be willing to
adhere to the limits proposed by the Model Penal
141 Id. at 155.
'4" Id. at 167.
146 In Poland, a single physician can authorize an
abortion on the oral declaration by the pregnant
woman that she has a "difficult social situation."
Tietze, supra note 136, at 230.
1
4 7 Skalts & Norgaard, supra note 143, at 161.
1's Hoffmeyer, supra note 130, at 186.
1 The Soviet experience with partial liberalization
supports this hypothesis. See Muller-Dietz, Abortion
in the Soviet, 1 REV. SOVIET MED. Sc. 28, 34 (1964).150WLMuAs, THE SANCTIT or LiE AND
CluimAL LAW 242 (1957); SHAw, ABORTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 39-40 (1966).
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Code is remote. The "abortion mentality" which
develops concomitant with partial legalization is
likely to strengthen the resolve of individual
physicians to follow their own best judgment.
Reputable hospitals, acting under approval of
"abortion committees," likewise may persist in
performing abortions which are not strictly legal.
Institutional responsibility obligates hospital
directors to stay within legal limits. Simultane-
ously, their personal beliefs impel them to go
beyond these bounds. In practice the committee
compromises, generally staying within the law,
but occasionally ignoring it in the most compelling
cases' 5' Unless the reform coincides with the
personal belief of the members of the committee,
one can expect them to continue to compromise
and occasionally violate the law when their con-
sciences so dictate. The Model Penal Code does
not take this into account. It merely legalizes
abortions already performed by a substantial
number of hospitals in jurisdictions with laws
which restrict legal abortions to those necessary
to save the life of the mother.152 Partial legaliza-
tion simply may result in the performance of
abortions in hospitals for a new variety of illegal
reasons. Moreover, it is probably easier for a
committee to construe facts to show significant
impairment to the pregnant woman's health,
than to demonstrate necessity to save her life.
Consequently, hospitals may violate the law
with even greater frequency than before the
passage of the reform.
Even if legislators expect hospitals to go beyond
legal limits, but they purposely use this approach
to avoid responsibility for passage of more exten-
sive reforms, undesirable effects will follow. This
approach discriminates against women who are
not sophisticated enough to manufacture stories
which create an appealing case. And those who
are clever enough to fabricate an effective case
are probably women wealthy enough to have
their pregnancies safely, although illegally, termi-
nated under present laws. Moreover, many
women will be discouraged from seeking, and
physicians from performing, safe abortions which
the legislators are willing to permit.
Continued Lack of Enforcement
There is not the slightest indication that local
authorities will attempt to enforce the new laws
16, Guttmacher. Therapeutic Abortion: The Doctor's
Dilemma, 21 J. MT. SiNAi Hosp. 111, 118 (1954).
im See Packer & Gampell, supra note 88.
more strictly than they enforced the old statutes.
Rather, juries and judges can be expected to be
more lenient as abortions become more acceptable.
The reforms simply substitute one "dead letter"
law for another, a situation decried in the official
comments to the Model Penal Code recommenda-
tion.1n
Discerning the motives of the American Law
Institute in recommending such ineffective legisla-
tion is beyond the scope of this paper. Expediency,
and fear of public opinion unprepared for broader
proposals, are among the suggestions which have
been made. TM The proper approach to reform would
have been to recognize the legitimate legal ob-
stacles, confront these objections directly, and
base a proposal on a fair resolution of the issues.
This is the direction which this paper will attempt
to follow.
OBSTACLE TO REpOI-m-ALLEGED RIGHS
oF THE FETUS
The legal position taken by virtually every
opponent to liberalization of the abortion statutes
is that conception is a dramatic moment in the
evolution of a human being, after which the fetus
becomes a "person" within the terms of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
other words, the fetus is entitled to the constitu-
tional protections which any citizen is accorded'
55
If one grants the initial premise of this argument
-that the fetus is entitled to constitutional
protection from its earliest stages-it is difficult,
if not impossible, to contend that the Model
Penal Code proposal, or any other permissive
legislation, meets appropriate standards. To
examine the consequences of this approach, it is
initially assumed that, at all times after concep-
tion, the fetus is a "person" under the fourteenth
amendment. On this assumption, the Model
153 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
154Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATE. LAW.
187, 188-90 (1959).
15- This is the legal position taken by Catholic
authors who are opposed to changes in the law. Elabora-
tion of this position may be found in the following
articles: Byrn, A Critical Look At Legalized Abortion,
41 L.A. BAR BuLL. 320 (1966); Byrn, Abortion in
Perspective, 5 DUQUEsNE L. Rv. 125 (1966); Byrn,
Abortion Question: A Nonsectarian Approach, 11
CAT . LAW. 315 (1965); Drinan, The Inviolability of
the Right to Be Born, in ABORTION AND TE LAW 107;
Mietus & Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of
Law" or a Challenge to Society, 51 A.B.A.J. 924 (1965);
Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Founda-
tions, 49 GEo. L. J. 173, 395 (1960-61).
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Penal Code proposal is unconstitutional for the
following reasons:
Violation of Substantive Due Process
The fourteenth amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." The
limitation which this clause imposes on the legis-
lature from enacting arbitrary and unreasonable
legislation is called substantive due process.
One can reasonably charge that the Model Penal
Code violates substantive due process because
it permits destruction of a fetus for a less compel-
ling reason than saving the life of another. By
analogy, the law of homicide generally restricts
the self-defense justification for a killing to situa-
tions where there are threats to life or threats
of serious bodily injury.lws In these cases, more-
over, the person killed had been a wilful ag-
gressor. The fetus, however, has committed no
crime or wilful aggression. A minimum of due
process, therefore, must prohibit a woman from
terminating a pregnancy, unless continuation of
the pregnancy seriously threatens her life or
physical health; legislation with provisions for
legal abortion in cases involving less significant
threats to the mother are unconstitutional. Thus,
the Model Penal Code provisions permitting
abortion for the sole reason that the girl is under
the age of consent,5 or on the basis that the child
is likely to be born with a serious defect,15 are
dearly unconstitutional because these situations
do not necessarily involve any threat to the
mother's life or health. Similarly, permitting
abortion of a fetus because continuation of the
pregnancy would impair the pregnant woman's
mental health, or because the fetus had been
conceived by a rapist, is of dubious legal validity.
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Violation of Procedural Due Process
The fourteenth amendment also protects against
judicial or administrative procedures which de-
prive a person of property or personal rights
by denying notice and opportunity for a hearing.
This is the right to procedural due process. One
can assert that the Model Penal Code violates
procedural due process because it authorizes a
156 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §197.1.
15 MODEL PENAL CODE §230.3(2) (Proposed Official




procedure whereby a fetus may be condemned
to death in a summary proceeding in which no
one defends its right to live.
The due process requirements for court pro-
cedure are summarized in Twining v. New Jersey:
The cases proceed upon the theory that, given
a court of justice which has jurisdiction and acts,
not arbitrarily but in conformity with a general
law, upon evidence, and after inquiry made with
notice to the parties affected and opportunity
to be heard, then all the requirements of due
process, so far as it relates to procedure in court and
methods of trial and character and effect of evi-
dence, are complied with."'
Clearly, the mere certification by two physicians
of their belief in the justifying circumstances,
or a like opinion of a hospital committee, is in-
adequate to meet these requirements. And even
though a medical committee may be treated as
an administrative tribunal, which is often subject
to less rigorous standards than a court, the same
elements of due process should be present in
any proceeding which authorizes the taking of a
life.
Furthermore, no provision is made for the
appointment of counsel, even though the fetus
undoubtedly qualifies as an indigent. 1 ' The
notorious "Scottsboro trial" involved the convic-
tion of seven ignorant and illiterate youthful
Negroes who had been accused of raping two
white girls.8 2 In that case the United States
Supreme Court held that the right to aid of
counsel is embraced within the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. A fortiori, a pro-
cedure which provides no one to defend the rights
of an "unborn child,"'83 and which is really no
trial at all, must violate due process. In the above
case, the Court stated:
Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner
charged with a capital offense, who is deaf and
dumb, illiterate and feeble-minded, unable to
employ counsel, with the whole power of the state
arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for
the state without assignment of counsel for his
1211 U.S. 78, 111 (1908).
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
The phrase "unborn child" is commonly used by
opponents of reform. It is submitted that this term is
as inappropriate a designation for a nonviable fetus
as is the term "unconceived fetus" for a sperm and
ovum not yet united, or the term "mature embryo"
for an infant.
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defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death.
Such a result, which, if carried into execution
would be little short of judicial murder, it cannot
be doubted would be a gross violation of the
guarantee of due process of law; and we venture to
think that no appellate court, state or federal,
would hesitate so to decide." 4
The Model Penal Code proposal is also too
vague to adequately safeguard the rights of the
fetus. A law which is too vague and uncertain
in its definition of an offense, or its violation, is
repugnant to the due process clause.6 6 Under
the Model Penal Code proposal, two physicians
can approve an abortion if "there is a substantial
risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of
the mother or that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect ....." Dictionaries
differ on the definition of these terms, and physi-
cians have already demonstrated their lack of
uniform agreement.166 For example, the World
Health Organization defines health as "a state
of complete physical, mental and social well being
and not merely the absence of disease or in-
firmity."'11 If physicians are permitted to use
this definition of health, they can legally terminate
pregnancies at whim.
Regardless of the definition intended, in the
absence of adequate supervision there can be no
assurance that the determination to terminate
a pregnancy will be made in anything but sub-
jective fashion. Yet, the records of the hearing,
if any exist, are private records. The fetus, even
if it had a defender, has no appeal because there
is no public record to review.
Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws
The Model Penal Code authorizes the destruc-
tion of the fetus with none of the safeguards
for justice which are accorded to even the most
hardened criminals. Therefore, the above viola-
tions of due process likewise violate the equal
protection clause, inasmuch as the due process
safeguards denied to the fetus are singularly
denied to fetuses, as compared with other beings
threatened with deprivation of life.
16 Supra note 162, at 72.
1 5 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1938).161 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
167 Quoted in Rovinsky & Gusberg, supra note 137.
TE ISSUE CONERONTED-SHOULD A FETUS BE
RECOGNIZED AS A PERSON WITH CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS?
The Model Penal Code proposal and similar
legislation infringe upon constitutional rights of
a fetus only if it is a "person" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the crucial
legal issue is the standing of the fetus to claim
constitutional protection. In other words, the
issue becomes whether it is necessary to treat
a fetus as an infant and an adult, or whether a
fetus may reasonably be classified as something
significantly different. If a fetus may reasonably
be classified as significantly different from an
infant and an adult, a court is free to decide that
the fetus does not have standing to claim the
constitutional protections described above.
The Model Penal Code is ambivalent on this
issue. It is difficult to believe that the prestigious
and knowledgeable members of the American
Law Institute would draft substantive and pro-
cedural provisions, the constitutionality of which
is so questionable. This necessarily implies that
the Institute assumed that the fetus is not en-
titled to constitutional protection. On the other
hand, abortions performed in a medically-approved
manner by licensed physicians remain criminal
unless justified. What rationale can there be for
declaring the some abortions serve a necessary
purpose, and then surrounding these legal abor-
tions with hedges and safeguards not required
for other serious operations, unless we are dealing
with issues of constitutional significance? This
problem is summarily mentioned without serious
analysis in the official A.L.I. Comments. With no
citation of authority, the Comments state:
There seems to be an obvious difference between
terminating the development of such an inchoate
being [as] a fetus in the first four months of preg-
nancy, whose chance of maturing is still somewhat
problematical, and, on the other hand, destroying
a fully formed viable fetus of eight months, where
the offense might well become ordinary murder if
the child should happen to survive for a moment
after it has been expelled from the body of its
mother.16
The recommended statute, however, makes
no distinction as to the stage of pregnancy at
which a physician must justify termination in
'L6 MODEL PENAL CODE §207.11, Comment at 149
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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order to avoid criminal liability. Therefore, it is
only one's personal preference which determines
whether the Comment means that a fetus is never
entitled to constitutional protection, or whether
it is an implied admission that the statute is
unconstitutional, at least in part.
This issue cannot be resolved on the basis of
dogmatic statements. Both the law and current
scientific knowledge should be examined.
Legal Status of the Fetus
There is no case law directly on point which
declares that a fetus is, or is not, entitled to the
protections described above. Nevertheless, analysis
of relevant areas of the law adequately demon-
strates that a fetus, at least in the early stages of
development, should not be treated as a person
entitled to constitutional guarantees.
The approach of using the criminal law to
protect a fetus from the time of conception is
relatively novel. Prior to 1803, legal prohibitions
against induced abortion were confined to the
stage known as "quickening," i.e., when the fetus
noticeably moved in the womb. 69 Thus, proposi-
tions seeking recognition of the "inherent inviola-
bility" of early fetal life cannot base their claims
on any notion of a natural law which has been
immutable through the ages.170 It is significant
that there is no reported record of the conviction
of a woman for submitting to an abortion although
she is, unquestionably, a principal.171 In contrast,
there is "considerable support for passing laws
to protect infants from abuse by their parents.1
72
One distinction between the treatment of abortion
and infanticide is that the infant child is considered
to be a human being, worthy of protection, but
the embryo is not'7
The dearth of case law on the constitutionality
of present abortion statutes itself implies that a
fetus has no constitutional rights. Statutes allow-
ing abortions necessary to save the life of the
1 9 WILLIAms, supra note 150, at 149.
170 Abortion has been accepted by a number of early
societies. See DEVEREUX, A STUDY of ABORTION IN
PRIMITIVE SocrETs (1955).
171 Several states treat her participation as solicita-
tion. See George, supra note 23, at 13. The author
notes that the importance of her testimony often means
that she must be granted immunity. However, in cases
where there had been a successful raid, her testimony
should not be necessary. See text accompanying notes
77-83 supra.
272See Paulson & Blake, The Abused, Battered, and
Maltreated Child: A Review, 9 TRAumA No. 4 (1967).
178 Wuiuns, supra note 150, at 215.
pregnant woman were enacted during the last
century. None requires appointment of counsel
or opportunity for a representative of the fetus
to be heard, as procedural due process allegedly
requires. The failure to question the constitu-
tionality of present abortion laws, in spite of
ample opportunity to do so, implicitly supports
the proposition that the fetus does not have a
right to be born. 74
Opponents of reform often rely on language
in cases deciding questions of inheritance, tort,
and support law where various courts accord
different "rights" to the fetus. These opinions,
however, are based on policy considerations which
either are wholly inapposite to a determination
of the constitutional rights of the fetus, or which
favor witholding constitutional protection. Cases
resolving questions of inheritance law and inter-
preting wrongful death statutes fall in the former
category; cases determining support rights and
cases upholding a cause of action for prenatal
injuries come within the latter.
Opponents of reform often point to rules of
property law which give a fetus, if subsequently
born alive, the same standing as a live child in
taking under a will which refers, for example, to
"all grandchildren alive at my death,"' 75 or in
taking under rules of intestate succession'
76
It is argued that, because a fetus is treated in
somewhat the same manner as a live child in the
context of dividing an inheritance, a fetus should
be given the same constitutional protections as
an infant. The policy being fostered by the prop-
erty law, however, is totally unrelated to considera-
tions involved in granting, or witholding, con-
stitutional protections of due process to the fetus.
The two situations are not analogous. The pur-
pose of the property rule is simply to follow the
presumed intent of the deceased in choosing
among those who are to share his bounty. It is
presumed that he would prefer to treat a fetus,
who is later born a child, in the same manner as
children already alive. These cases require a
subsequent live birth because it is unreasonable to
presume that the deceased valued the fetus, by
itself, in any way. Using decisions based on this
policy as a justification for granting the constitu-
tional right of due process to the fetus is clearly
inappropriate. Within the limits set by the rele-
274 See Sands, Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer
to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 285, 305 (1966).
7 In re Wells' Will, 221 N.Y. Supp. 714 (1927).
176 ATKIsoN, W=ri 75 (2d ed. 1953).
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vant statute against perpetuities, a testator can
also provide for people who are not yet conceived
at his death, as well as those who are conceived
but not yet born."n The logic of opponents of
reform would require courts to declare a constitu-
tional right to be conceived. This would directly
conflict with the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut which
allowed a husband and wife to practice birth
control."' Read narrowly, the Court held only
that a husband and wife have a constitutional
right to privacy which cannot be abridged by a
criminal statute prohibiting the use of contracep-
tives. However, the interest protected must
necessarily include an affirmative right of access
to birth control information so that the couple
could reasonably regulate the intimacies of their
marital relationship 9
One very recent case has permitted recovery
under a wrongful death statute for injury to a
nonviable fetus which caused its premature live
birth and subsequent death."' One could super-
ficially distinguish this case on the narrow ground
that it involved a subsequent live birth, whereas
abortion involves no live birth in most cases.
However, the court, in dicta, indicated that the
live birth was not an essential factor for recovery.
Even so, the case is still inapplicable. The policy
fostered by permitting recovery simply is that a
husband and wife should be recompensed for
injuries which cause the loss of potential society
and companionship.tm The same policy would
favor a tort cause of action against a wrongdoer
who caused a man or woman to become sterile.Y
82
As demonstrated above, allowing such a cause
of action cannot compel declaration of a constitu-
tional right to be conceived. Therefore, the cases
also fail to support the declaration of a constitu-
tional right to be born. The two situations are
not analogous.
Opponents of reform occasionally point to cases
holding that a fetus is a dependent child under
17 See Snms, FurTRn, INTE a sTs 263-69 (2d ed.
1966).
'7' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'7, Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional
Charter For an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L.
REv. 197, 212 (1965).
180 Torgian v. Watertown News, 225 N.E.2d 926
(1967).
is, 'Possma, TonRs 930 (3d ed. 1964).
8 Valence v. La. Power & Light Co., 52 La. 2d 847,
50 So. 2d 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1951).
support laws,'8 ' and cases -permitting suit, via a
guardian, for a determination of paternity and
compulsory support."4 They contend that these
cases indicate that a fetus should be treated as a
child for purposes of receiving constitutional
protections. The obvious policy of support cases,
however, is to prevent children from becoming
wards of the state.8'8 Since a fetus which is aborted
cannot become a ward of the state, the cases do not
support the position advanced. Indeed, continua-
tion of restrictive abortion laws, which are re-
sponsible for the deaths of mothers of large, low-
income families, is directly contrary to the policy
being fostered by the support cases. ' Therefore,
these cases should be considered as support for
witholding constitutional rights from the fetus,
in order to avoid retarding the passage of reforms
which establish safe procedures for terminating
pregnancies.
In recent years there has been a trend toward
permitting greater recovery for prenatal injuries
to children born live.'8 ' Early cases often had
asserted that the fetus was merely part of the
mother, and they denied recovery on the ground
that no duty was owed separately to the fetus.'
On this basis, courts easily made exceptions for a
viable fetus, since, by definition, it was capable of
an independent existence" 9 Courts are now
overruling old cases, and they are allowing re-
covery for injuries sustained by a nonviable
fetus. 9' Opponents of reform allege that this is a
recognition that a fetus should be treated as an
independent person under the fourteenth amend-
ment from the time of conception.
Examination of the cases reveals, however,
8 E.g., Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d
1189 (1936).
114 Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d
806 (1940).
"'See CAL. Civ. CODE §29: "A child conceived, but
not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far
as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its
subsequent birth." (Emphasis added.)
18 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
87 E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946); Scott v. Mcpheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92
P.2d 678 (3d Dist. 1939); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,
197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1951); Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.
2d 334 (1949).
' Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
' E.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946).
"' Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93,
overruling Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547,
16 A.2d 28 (1940); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960), overrding Stemmer v. Kline,
128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (Ct. App. 1942).
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that the courts used the viability test as a facade
to conceal their fear that the lack of reliable medi-
cal knowledge about causation would permit a
flood of fictitious claims. Scientific advancements
in causal analysis, not a revaluation of the status
of the fetus, have changed the attitude of courts.191
Regardless of the reason for the change, the
policy justifications for allowing the tort cause
of action are either inapplicable or favor denial
of constitutional rights to the fetus. Recovery is
partially based on sympathy for a person who is
forced to bear an injury through life. A fetus which
never develops into a child bears no injuries.
This consideration is inapplicable in evaluating
the merits of imposing criminal liability for
prevention, of birth or in evaluating the propriety
of granting the fetus constitutional rights of due
process.
Recovery is also permitted for "the very practi-
cal reason that a child starting with a handicap
due to a prenatal injury may very possibly wind
up receiving social welfare assistance unless he
can be compensated for his injuries at a time when
the recovery will aid his adjustment."12 This is
the identical policy which underlies support cases
and, likewise, favors witholding constitutional
rights from the fetus.
Some recent developments in the law of murder
may indicate that viability is the point beyond
which the law cannot deprive a fetus of the same
protection accorded to infants. At common law
the full protection conferred by the law of murder
was restricted to human beings born alive. Birth,
in English law, meant complete extrusion from
the mother, although the umbilical cord need not
have been severed.' Consequently, if a person
strangled an infant while only its head protruded
from the mother, that person would not be guilty
of murder. An English author has severely criti-
cized this anomaly, suggesting that a viable fetus,
capable of independent life, should be entitled to
the full protection of the law.9 4 Appellate courts
in California and Alabama have judicially adopted
lg Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the
Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. Rev.
554, 563, 600 (1962). See also PRossxa, TonTs 357
(3d ed. 1964). See, e.g., Eaton & Danziger, Traumatic
Disruption of Pregnancy: Report of a Case and Its
Legal Implications, 30 OBsMMtcs & GNvcoLoGy 16
(1967).
19 Sands, supra note 174, at 302.
"' WmuLms, supra note 150, at 6.
1M Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. Rnv.
134 (1904).
his opinion. 99 Other states are likely to follow
this approach when the situation arises.
The social policy underlying the prohibition of
murder is the protection of existing human beings.
This policy significantly distinguishes the law
of murder from tort and property law. The latter
may accord the fetus "rights" to further policies
which are not based upon the present human
status of the fetus. Tort law has an interest in
protecting a potential human being which may
subsequently become a ward of the state. The
laws of testate and intestate succession have an
interest in giving rights to a potential human being
which may develop into someone for whom a
deceased would have felt affection at that time.
But if the law of murder, which has an interest
solely in protecting existing human beings, pro-
tects a viable fetus, it must be because a viable
fetus is considered to be an existing human being.
When the fetus is no longer a potential human
being, but has developed into an existing human
being, it may reasonably be entitled to due process.
One could argue, therefore, that viability is the
stage at which a fetus should be granted constitu-
tional protection.
In sum, no court to date has directly decided
whether a fetus is entitled to due process under
the fourteenth amendment. Some cases deciding
tort issues, inheritance rights, and liability under
support laws superficially appear to recognize
the fetus as a human being, entitled to due process.
In reality, decisions in these cases are based on a
variety of social policies, many of which clearly
favor witholding constitutional rights from the
fetus. However, relevant developments in homi-
cide law indicate that fetal life in the last stages
of development should be accorded the protection
of due process. Determination of the rights of
early fetal life is, apparently, open to a decision
made apart from precedent and based wholly-on
the social implications of the decision.
The Fetus and Science
In determining the stage of prenatal develop-
ment for applying constitutional protection, the
law should choose a point which the community
at large reasonably can be expected to respect.
The public uniformly accepts the proposition
that infants deserve the same constitutional
protections as adults. Therefore, when the fetus
11 People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.
2d 92 (4th Dist. 1947); Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App.
536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
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significantly resembles the infant, it is fair to
constitutionally protect the fetus and require the
public to treat the fetus and the infant identically.
However, when the fetus does not significantly
resemble the infant, it would be unfair to grant
the fetus the same constitutional rights and legally
require that the public regard the fetus and the
infant in the same manner. One should note that
withholding constitutional protection from the
fetus does not mean that a fetus cannot be con-
sidered a human being from some aesthetic view-
point. Nor does withholding constitutional protec-
tion prevent a person from making an independent
moral determination on this issue. Each individual
remains free to decide whether or not he will
treat the fetus with the reverence he feels for
an infant. But individual determinations of
morality simply are not imposed on those who
reasonably disagree.
In making legal determinations regarding
prenatal life, one also must distinguish between
scientific facts and inferences drawn from scien-
tific facts. Medical-legal problems require analysis
of relevant scientific knowledge. However, scien-
tists usually make inferences for scientific, rather
than legal, purposes. An inference drawn for a
particular scientific inquiry is not necessarily
relevant to a legal inquiry, or even a different
scientific inquiry. Thus, scientists can reasonably
disagree in choosing the most significant point of
human development. Geneticists emphasize the
union of sperm and ovum because it limits heredi-
tary potentialities." Some psychologists believe
that the most important point of human develop-
ment occurs between ages five and seven, because
children then respond more like adults than ani-
mals.17 Each scientist arrives at a different con-
clusion because the purpose of his inquiry differs.
As legal purposes differ from scientific purposes,
inferences for legal determinations of the prenatal
stage at which protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment should apply reasonably can differ from
inferences for scientific determinations. Although
the fourteenth amendment guarantees rights to
"persons," determinations of the origin of in-
dividual life made for biological or other scientific
purposes clearly are not controlling. For legal
19
6 See ROBERTS, AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL
GENETICS 1 (3d ed. 1965).
12 See White, Evidence for a Hierarchical Arrange-
ment of Learning Processes, in 2 ADVANCES IN CmLD
DEVELOPMENT AMro BEHAVIOR 187, 195 (Lipsett &
Spiker eds. 1965).
purposes, a corporation, as well as a human
being, is considered a "person" under the four-
teenth amendment.1 9
Prenatal development of the infant will now
be examined. A general overview will be followed
by examination of particular stages. The term
"fetus," which heretofore has been used to refer
to all biological stages of prenatal development
after fertilization, technically refers only to pre-
natal development after the second lunar month.
In medical terminology, intrauterine life is
divided into three phases-the periods of the
ovum, the embryo, and the fetus 99 The period
of the ovum is the initial phase. It extends through
the first week of human development. It encom-
passes the zygote, or fertilized ovum, its subdivi-
sions into smaller cells called blastomeres, and
the arrangement of these cells into a hollow blasto-
cyst. The period of the embryo includes the second
through the eighth week of prenatal life. This
period is characterized by rapid growth, establish-
ment of a placental relationship with the pregnant
woman, acquisition of a general body plan, and
development of basic external features. The period
of the fetus includes the third through the tenth
lunar month. In it differentiation, or progressive
diversification of cells and tissues, continues, and
organs become competent to assume their special-
"ized functions.
This development is continuous, and it pro-
gresses for many years after infancy. Not until
age twenty-five are the last stages of adult develop-
ment complete.90 No stage of development seems
inherently more significant than another. There-
fore, any particular stage is significant only be-
cause of the legal consequences one chooses to
attach at that point.
1. Fertilization. Opponents of abortion law
reform allege that human life should be inviolable
from the "moment of conception." They claim
that biologists recognize that life begins with a
fertilized ovum and, consequently, the law must
do likewise. During fertilization, the male and
female gametes pool their nucleii and chromo-
somes.20' Opponents of reform contend that
these events mark the emergence of a human
being entitled to due process.
199 Connecticut Gen. Co. v. Johnson, 308 U.S. 77
(1938).
199 AnxY, DEVELO PENTAL ANATOMY 85 (7th ed.
1965).
200 Id. at 2.
201 Id. at 55.
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Such an approach is subject to several criticisms.
As discussed above,, reliance on determinations
made by biologists disregards the distinction be-
tween scientific facts and inferences drawn from
scientific facts. An inference drawn by biologists,
for biological purposes, is not entitled to weight
in a legal determination.
One should also note that the phrase, "moment
of conception," misleadingly connotes an in-
stantaneous transformation. Fertilization, how-
ever, is a time-consuming process. The sperm
first penetrates the egg. Then the sperm head
rotates and advances, toward the center of the egg.
As it approaches the center, the head swells and
converts into the male pronucleus. The male and
female pronucleii then approach and unite.
Even fusion is a process. As the male and female
pronucleii approach each other, they resolve their
chromosomes. Finally, a cleavage spindle or-
ganizes with the double set of male and female
chromosomes arranged midway as an equatorial
plate. If a human being emerges after a "moment
of conception," it is not at all clear which "mo-
ment" is most significant.
The chromosomes which organize at fertiliza-
tion do determine numerous traits which the
infant and adult eventually exhibit. 202 It is fal-
lacious, however, to argue that the fertilized
ovum bears a significant resemblance to the in-
fant merely because the infant develops from the
fertilized ovum. The origin of the infant can be
traced back even further. Embryology texts
begin with a discussion of gametogenesis, the pro-
duction of spermatozoa in the male and matura-
tion of ova in the female, as the first phase in
sexual reproduction. 213 Yet, no one believes that
presently existing human beings are destroyed
by menstruation or nocturnal emissions. Sperm
and ova do not significantly resemble existing
human beings. Only potential human beings are
lost even though a human being originates in a
sperm and an ovum.
Similarly, abortion of a fertilized ovum de-
stroys only a potential, not a presently existing,
human being. The fertilized ovum is a microscopic,
single-celled organism. In appearance it differs
little from an unfertilized ovum. It has neither
brain, nervous system, nor bodily organs. The
term "human being" generally connotes bodily
structure and intelligence. The fertilized ovum
20 2 
ROBERTS, supra note 196, at 1.
203Se, e.g., HAMILTON, BOYD & MossmN, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 12 (3d ed. 1962).
exhibits neither of these characteristics. 204 Prior
to the seventh week of development, the human
embryo is incapable of even reflex activity.205
It is difficult to maintain that a fertilized ovum
bears a significant resemblance to an infant. There-
fore, it is unreasonable to grant due process
rights at fertilization; it would be unfair to require
that the public regard the fertilized ovum with
the same respect they may prefer to reserve for an
infant.
2. Viability. Advocates of abortion reform
generally contend that viability is the stage at
which to grant the fetus rights. Viability, the
capacity to survive outside the womb, occurs
between the twenty-sixth and the twenty-eighth
week of pregnancy.2 0 At this stage the single-cell
zygote has transformed into a fully-formed infant.
The propriety of delaying constitutional pro-
tection until actual birth is questionable. No one
denies premature babies the right to be treated
as human beings entitled to due process. The
growth careers of full-term, pre-term, and post-
term infants are basically similar. 20 Thus, a
fetus which attains viability develops in the same
manner whether or not it remains in the womb,
and a viable fetus resembles many infants. One
can reasonably require that the public regard a
viable fetus as an existing human being entitled
to constitutional protection.
3. Intermediary periods. Because opponents of
reform emphasize fertilization, while advocates
of reform emphasize viability, little attention is
given to intermediary stages of development.
However, one need not withhold constitutional
rights until viability merely because one rejects
fertilization as an unreasonable stage for granting
constitutional protections. Although a fetus
cannot survive outside the womb before the end
of the sixth lunar month, human resemblance in
some respects begins earlier. For example, ihe
face of the fetus has a human appearance in the
fourth lunar month, and individual differences are
recognizable at that time.211 In the fifth lunar
21 Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLO.
L. R v. 178, 197 (1966).
205 Hooker, The Sequence in Human Fetal Activity,
in READINGS IN CHILD BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 11
(Stendler ed. 1964).20
6 TAussIG, supra note 2, at 21.
207 Behavior patterns are not affected by premature
or postmature birth. Gesell, Maturation and Infant
Behavior Pattern in READN S IN Cmn BEHAVIoR AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 205, at 25.
200 AREY, supra note 199, at 100.
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month the pregnant woman can feel fetal move-
ments.
20
There is a particular logical advantage in
granting the fetus constitutional rights after the
fourth or fifth lunar month of development, even
if one assumes that viability is the single point of
development most significant for legal purposes.
The scientific fact is that human development is a
process, not an instantaneous transformation.
By granting constitutional protection at the begin-
ning of a period of evolving viability, the law
can recognize that humanization, like growth, is
a developmental process.
Relevant legal and scientific facts indicate
that viability is the most rational single point
at which to recognize the emergence of a human
being with constitutional rights. However, choos-
ing a single point of time is inconsistent with the
scientific fact that human development is a
process. Therefore, it may be wiser to recognize
a crucial span of time during which the fetus
attains viability, and grant the fetus constitutional
rights throughout this period and thereafter.
PROPOSAL-UNREGULATED MEDICAL CONTROL
DURING THE FIRST SIXTEEN WEEKS OF
PREGNANCY
Once one concludes that there is no constitu-
tional necessity to accord the fetus due process
rights throughout the early pregnancy period,
it is difficult to find any valid reason for regulating
abortions which are performed by physicians
during that time. It is reasonable to prohibit
nonphysicians from ever terminating pregnancies
in order to safeguard the health of the pregnant
woman. But the problems underlying the need for
law revision clearly indicate that physicians
should be free to act according to their best medi-
cal judgment during the early pregnancy period.
The approach most likely to reduce the in-
cidence of injuries and deaths from abortions is to
encourage women to terminate unwanted preg-
nancies in hospitals under hygienic conditions.
Approval by not more than two physicians should
be required. The greater the number of physicians
whose approval is needed, the more likely a woman
will resort to an illegal abortion. Some women
may feel humiliated and inconvenienced when
forced to undergo complicated administrative
209 Ibid. "Bursts of activity" are characteristic of
the fetus at this time. Hooker, supra note 205, at 16.
procedures which are not required for other
operations. Others cannot afford to pay several
physicians for their services. Wealthy women still
may prefer an illegal abortion, fearful that they
may lack the time necessary to repeat formal
proceedings at a different hospital if the first
hospital eventually denies their application.
In order to eliminate illegal abortions, a reform
should not regulate the criteria for terminating
pregnancy. Most women seek abortions for general
social, rather than medical, reasons. Any regulatory
law which permits physicians to terminate preg-
nancies for purely social reasons necessarily will be
so loosely phrased that it will provide no regula-
tion at all. Nevertheless, some physicians may be
inhibited from following their best medical judg-
ment when even a remote possibility of being
subjected to criminal sanctions exists.
Many opponents of abortion reform may find
that outright repeal is more philosophically ac-
ceptable to them than the Model Penal Code
proposal. To those who believe that abortion is a
form of homicide, the state authorizes the killing
of innocent human beings when it enacts a version
of the Model Penal Code proposal. In contrast,
repeal does not mean that the state approves of
abortion, but only that it declines to regulate it.
Father Robert F. Drinan, a Jesuit priest and
Dean of the Boston College Law School, is one
of the leading opponents of abortion reform. In a
paper prepared for the 1967 International Con-
ference on Abortion, he wrote:
If one assumes that the law teaches minds as well
as regulates conduct the potential teaching impact
of a law which exalts the superiority of a mother's
health over her child's right to be born and of a
legal system which specifically permits the anni-
hilation of predictably deformed or retarded
children can hardly be exaggerated. Such a system
creates a new and revolutionary hierarchy of rights
in which the rights of the living to happiness
transcend the rights of the unborn to existence. A
law which is silent about the abortion of non-viable
fetuses says no such thing. It neither concedes nor
denies to individuals the right to abort their un-
born children. It leaves the area unregulated in
the same way that the law abstains from regulat-
ing many areas of conduct where moral issues are
involved.210
Previously, this paper demonstrated that the
21 Drinan, The Right of the Fetus to be Born, Un-
published paper presented to the International Con-
ference on Abortion, Sept. 6-8, 1967, Washington, D.C.
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Model Penal Code proposal is probably uncon-
stitutional if one assumes that a nonviable fetus
is a person entitled to due process under the
fourteenth amendment. Likewise, this proposal
is also of questionable constitutional validity
when one rejects that assumption. The Model
Penal Code provides no accurate guide for physi-
cians who wish to obey the law, because such key
words as "grave" and "substantial" are nowhere
defined. Physicians who terminate pregnancies
in good faith may find themselves criminally
liable if a jury later disagrees with their opinion
as to whether a particular pregnancy involved a
substantial risk of gravely impairing the health
of the mother. Because the recommended statute
is too vague, the procedural due process rights of
physicians are violated.
The statute also violates substantive due process
rights of married couples. In the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the existence of a constitutional
right to marital privacy.m "The concept of
liberty ... embraces the right of marital privacy
though that right is not mentioned explicitly in
the Constitution .... ,, 212 In Griswold, the Court
held unconstitutional a criminal statute which
prohibited the use of contraceptive devices by
married couples, stating:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is re-
pulsive to the notions of privacy sur rounding the
marriage relationship.213
If the bedroom is a sanctuary of marital privacy,
the law cannot regard a married woman's repro-
ductive organs differently.
- 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 Id. at 486 (Goldberg J., concurring).
•W1Id. at 485 (Douglas J., majority).
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the
purposes that underlie its specific guarantees
demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise afamily are of similar order
and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifi-
cally protected.21'
Since the Court declared unconstitutional a
statute which prohibited the limitation of family
size through the use of contraceptives, the con-
stitutional right to "raise a family" must also be
a constitutional right to limit family size. Most
abortions are sought by women to limit family
size. Prior to the commencement of a period of
evolving viability, there is no distinction, signifi-
cant for legal purposes, between the fetus and
individual sperm and ovum. Therefore, any
statute which prohibits abortion during the early
stages of pregnancy is as unconstitutional an
invasion of marital privacy as is a statute which
prohibits the use of contraceptives.
The Model Penal Code recommendation was
officially proposed in 1962. The American Law
Institute cannot be criticized for ignorance of a
marital right to privacy which was first judicially
recognized in 1965. The states which recently
have enacted modified versions of the Model
Penal Code proposal have no similar excuse. They
have enacted legislation which ineffectively and
unconstitutionally deals with the problem of
unwanted pregnancy. The only reasonable ap-
proach is to equate termination of early preg-
nancy with every other medical operation. No
physician should be subject to penal sanctions for
performing an abortion on a woman who is not
more than sixteen weeks pregnant. Criminal
statutes which regulate abortions performed by
physicians during that time should be repealed.
14 Id. at 495 (Goldberg J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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